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Abstract
This note considers the effects of altruism on cooperation in the context of a repeated
Prisoner's Dilemma. Altruism has two conflicting impacts on cooperation: One is to reduce
the temptation for defection; the other is to make the future punishment ineffective. The total
effect of altruism hinges on the shape of players' cost functions.
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It is broadly acknowledged that altruism can increase the bene￿ts of social in-
teractions by reducing the incentive for free riding (e.g., Axelrod 1984, 72; Andreoni
1990; Andreoni and Miller 1993; Fehr and Gachter 2002). These articles argue that
altruism improves cooperative performances. In contrast, Bernheim and Stark (1988)
described the detrimental e⁄ect of altruism which generates an enforcement prob-
lem; altruism may reduce the e⁄ectiveness of credible punishment.1 Recent empirical
￿ndings from microcredit seem to con￿rm their prediction: a group of borrowers
with strong social connectedness is more likely to default (Guinnane 1994; Ahlin and
Townsend 2007).2 How can these two con￿ icting forces of altruism coexist? Under
what condition one of them dominates the other?
I address these questions by constructing a model of repeated game theory with a
continuous version of Prisoner￿ s Dilemma. Here are obtained results from the model.
(a) Altruism may have two con￿ icting e⁄ects on cooperation. One is to moderate the
temptation to betray others, as argued in the standard literature of altruism above.
The other is to reduce the e⁄ectiveness of punishment because it is not altruist￿ s
interest to punish a deviant from cooperation. The total e⁄ect of altruism hinges
on which e⁄ect dominates. (b) I further derive conditions for altruism to facilitate
cooperation and to hinder it. The total e⁄ect of altruism depends on the shape
of players￿payo⁄ functions. More precisely, if the marginal cost does not increase
rapidly, altruism signi￿cantly reduces the e⁄ectiveness of punishment and thus creates
a severe enforcement problem. (c) The e⁄ect of altruism might be non-monotonic.
In such a case, social cooperation is most di¢ cult in the middle range of altruism.
Without altruism, people can make credible threats of punishment, and with su¢ cient
altruism, there is no con￿ ict of interests among people.
2. The Model
2.1 Stage Game
There are two players in the game. Each player i 2 f1;2g chooses action ai ￿ 0.
Player i￿ s payo⁄ in the stage game ￿i(a1;a2;￿) is a weighted average of two players￿
material payo⁄s:
￿i(a1;a2;￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)gi(a1;a2) + ￿gj(a1;a2);
1Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) provided another (time-inconsistency) problem caused by altruism:
Expecting endowment from altruistic parents in the future, a child may overconsume today, leading
to a socially ine¢ cient outcome.
2Guinnane (1994) compared ￿nancial markets of Germany and Ireland in the late nineteenth
century and reported that a group lending system which was very successful in rural areas of Germany
failed to be successfully transplanted to Ireland. He reasoned that if borrowers were socially closed
to each other, their implicit threats to penalize defaulters would be weakened. Ahlin and Townsend
(2007) found that the impact of altruism on loan repayment of group lending in ￿nancial markets of
Thailand is negative and is statistically signi￿cant. These ￿ndings suggest that social cooperation
might be less successful among people with altruistic concerns.
1where ￿ 2 [0;1=2] denotes the degree of players￿altruism. When ￿ = 0, players
are perfectly self-interested, and each player does not care about the other￿ s interest
at all. When ￿ = 1=2, they are perfectly altruistic, and their preferences exactly
coincide. For simplicity, I consider only cases in which two players have the same
degree of altruism (symmetric altruism).
The material payo⁄ function gi(a1;a2) is given as
gi(a1;a2) ￿ aj ￿ c(ai);
where c(a) is the cost function which has the following properties: c(0) = 0; c0(0) = 0;
lim
a!1c0(a) = 1; c0(a) > 0 for a > 0 and c00(a) > 0 for a > 0 (strictly convex). One
can imagine that each player i gives the amount ai of gifts to the other player j at
cost c(ai). Thus, the stage game has the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma structure: unless players
are perfectly altruistic (￿ = 1=2), the pair of dominant strategies by the two players
constitute a Pareto suboptimal outcome.
2.2 Repeated Game
Consider in￿nite interaction between the two players. Player i￿ s average payo⁄ in
the repeated game is described as (1 ￿ ￿)
P1
t=0 ￿
t￿i;t(a1;t;a2;t;￿), where ￿ is the rate
at which future payo⁄s are discounted.
3. Results
3.1 Altruistic Cooperation without Punishments
In a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, each player maximizes his payo⁄, given
the other player￿ s action:
max
ai











where aNE(￿) is an action in the equilibrium.
Lemma 1 aNE(￿) is the unique dominant strategy in the stage game.
Proof. aNE(￿) is unique for given ￿ because c(a) is strictly convex and c0(a) is
unbounded from above. In addition, aNE(￿) is independent of the other player￿ s
action. Thus, aNE(￿) is the unique dominant strategy.




forms the unique Nash equilibrium. De￿ne





Lemma 2 aNE(￿) monotonically increases in ￿, and so does P(￿). That is, altruism
facilitates cooperation in the stage game.




















As players become more altruistic, they cooperate more in the sense that the level
of actions in equilibrium becomes higher. When ￿ = 1=2, the con￿ ict of interests
between players disappears, and they cooperate most.
3.2 Altruistic Cooperation with Punishments
Following Bernheim and Stark (1988), I restrict attention to subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium with Nash reversion in the repeated game. Suppose that both players are
taking the same action a+ > aNE(￿) and receiving the payo⁄ G(a+) ￿ a+ ￿ c(a+) >
P(￿). If a player (say, player 1) cheats the other player (player 2) by choosing the
dominant action aNE(￿) instead of a+, then both players will take the action aNE(￿);
ending up with lower payo⁄ P(￿) for all the subsequent periods. I de￿ne the (player
1￿ s) temptation payo⁄by cheating the other to be T(a+;￿) ￿ ￿1(aNE(￿);a+;￿): This
temptation is a⁄ected by altruism as follows.
Lemma 3 T(a+;￿) monotonically decreases in ￿; i.e., altruism reduces the tempta-
tion to cheat the other.







+)) < 0: (3)
The incentive constraint for the action pro￿le (a+;a+) to be sustained as subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium with "Nash-threat" punishments is:
G(a
+) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)T(a
+;￿) + ￿P(￿): (4)







This implies that players must be patient enough that they are afraid of future pun-
ishments.
33.3 Con￿ icting E⁄ects of Altruism
Lemmas 2 and 3 with Condition (4) imply that altruism has two con￿ icting e⁄ects
on cooperation: One is to make the future punishment ine⁄ective; the other is to
reduce the temptation to defect. The total e⁄ect of altruism depends on which force
is dominant to the other.
Proposition 1 Altruism makes cooperation less sustainable (i.e., ￿(a+;￿) increases

























which is positive if and only if Condition (5) holds.
In Condition (5), G(a+) ￿ P(￿) and T(a+;￿) ￿ G(a+) denote the strength of
punishment and that of temptation, respectively. Thus, Condition (5) compares the
percentage change in the e⁄ectiveness of punishment with the percentage change in
the incentive for temptation.
The following corollary shows that the shape of cost function c(a) matters for the
e⁄ect of altruism on cooperation.
Corollary 1 A small rise in ￿ from ￿ = 0 increases ￿(a+;￿) if
lim
a!+0c
00 (a) = 0: (6)
Proof. In Condition (5), G(a+) ￿ P(￿); T(a+;￿) ￿ G(a+) and
@T(a+;￿)
@￿ are all ￿nite
(see Equation (3)), but
@P(￿)






2): Since aNE(￿) for small ￿, if the term c00 (a) is small enough with small a, the left
hand side of Condition (5) becomes very large, and the condition surely holds.
Condition (6) means that the marginal cost rises very slowly or the slope of mar-
ginal cost is very ￿ at for low levels of actions. If the marginal cost increases in
the level of action very slowly, then altruism substantively deprives players of hard
punishment, and as a result, players are more induced to deviate from cooperation.
The next example is the case that the cost function is the power function.
Example 1 Assume c(a) = al with l > 1. If l > 2, then a small rise in ￿ increases
￿(a+;￿).





























Required d, given a
+ with l=2





























Required d, given a
+ with l=4
Figure 1: Required discount factors for various levels of action and altruism.
Put di⁄erently, when l > 2, Condition 5 is satis￿ed, and altruistic preferences
require the larger ￿ to enforce cooperation. Figure 1 shows the relationship between
required discount factors ￿(a+;￿) and altruism ￿ for l = 2;4; given levels of actions
a+. It can be seen that with l = 2, altruism monotonically lowers ￿(a+;￿) and it
makes cooperation easier. In contrast, with l = 4, the e⁄ect of altruism ￿ on required
discount factor ￿(a+;￿) is non-monotonic. The ￿gure implies that cooperation is most
di¢ cult with a middle range of altruism. Cooperation is relatively easy for small ￿,
because players can create e⁄ective punishment. It is also easy for su¢ ciently large
￿ because there is no con￿ ict of interests. This example con￿rms that altruism may
make cooperation more di¢ cult to enforce in a certain circumstance.
4. Conclusion
This note shows two con￿ icting e⁄ects of altruism on cooperation: one is to moder-
ate the temptation for cheating, and the other to alleviate the e⁄ectiveness of punish-
ment on a defector. The total e⁄ect of altruism hinges on the shape of cost functions.
If the marginal cost of cooperation is su¢ ciently low, altruism signi￿cantly reduces
the e⁄ectiveness of punishment, and altruism can hinder cooperation.
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